Economic Sanctions’ Effectiveness in a World with Interdependent Networks and Powerful MNCs: The Role of Governance in the Target State by Figuerola, Pia
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research
Electronic Journal College of Arts and Sciences
2015
Economic Sanctions’ Effectiveness in a World with
Interdependent Networks and Powerful MNCs:
The Role of Governance in the Target State
Pia Figuerola
University of Pennsylvania, piaf@sas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/curej
Part of the Political Science Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/190
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Figuerola, Pia, "Economic Sanctions’ Effectiveness in a World with Interdependent Networks and
Powerful MNCs: The Role of Governance in the Target State" 01 January 2015. CUREJ: College
Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania, http://repository.upenn.edu/
curej/190.
Economic Sanctions’ Effectiveness in a World with Interdependent
Networks and Powerful MNCs: The Role of Governance in the Target
State
Abstract
Economic sanctions are increasingly becoming the instrument of choice for countries to exert pressure on
others, due to their non-violent nature. However, sanctions effectiveness has often been a source of concern.
There is a large body of literature analyzing what factors influence economic sanctions effectiveness, including
political variables such as international cooperation, prior relations between sender and target states, etc., as
well as economic variables such as the average cost of sanctions, trade linkages, etc. This thesis attempts to
make a contribution by exploring the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in sanctions regimes, as they
have become the main actor in sanction implementation in the current globalized world. Given this context,
there is a need to analyze the impact of sanctions on the profit maximization of firms, including the effect of
the pressures applied by sender and target states to influence the implementation of sanctions by the MNCs.
In exploring these issues, this thesis concludes that there is a factor that has generally been overlooked when
analyzing the behavior of MNCs’ responses to sanctions—the level of governance in the target state. The level
of governance in the target state determines the environment in which MNCs operate. Furthermore, this
influence over the strategic choice planning on firms will help determine the MNCs’ decisions to either
comply or evade the sanctions, eventually determining the level of sanctions effectiveness. This thesis has
found both statistical and country case evidence in this regard, raising implications that could prove to be
useful when designing and implementing economic sanctions in future cases.
Keywords
Economic Sanctions, Effectiveness, Governance, Political Science, Edward Mansfield, Mansfield, Edward
Disciplines
Political Science
This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/190
  
 
Economic Sanctions’ Effectiveness in a World with  
Interdependent Networks and Powerful MNCs:  
The Role of Governance in the Target State 
Pia Figuerola 
 
 
 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Edward Mansfield 
Senior Honors Thesis in Political Science 
 
 
 
 
University of Pennsylvania 
Spring 2015 
Pia Figuerola 
 
 
2
Acknowledgements  
 I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Dr. Edward Mansfield, for his 
thoughtful guidance throughout this process, as well as his patience and encouragement that were 
critical for the completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. David Hsu whose seminar 
on Economic Statecraft spurred my interest in economic sanctions and helped me narrow the 
focus of this thesis. Dr. Doherty-Sil also gave me invaluable assistance and contributed to make 
this thesis possible, from discussing the initial proposal, to leading the thesis seminar, to 
providing reassurance during the final weeks. Finally, I would like to thank my fellow colleagues 
in the thesis seminar as they provided endless support during both the seminar and this semester.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pia Figuerola 
 
 
3
Table of Contents                                                                                                                   PAGE 
SECTION 1 – Introduction ..............................................................................................................4 
SECTION 2 – Literature Review .....................................................................................................6 
SECTION 3 – Research Question and Hypothesis ........................................................................15 
SECTION 4 – Logical Analysis ....................................................................................................17  
SECTION 5 – Statistical Analysis .................................................................................................26 
SECTION 6 – Case Studies ...........................................................................................................31  
SECTION 7 –Conclusion and Policy Lessons...............................................................................56  
Appendix – Economic analysis of impact of trade sanctions ........................................................60 
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................62 
  
Pia Figuerola 
 
 
4
Abstract 
 
Economic sanctions are increasingly becoming the instrument of choice for countries to exert 
pressure on others, due to their non-violent nature. However, sanctions effectiveness has often been a 
source of concern. There is a large body of literature analyzing what factors influence economic sanctions 
effectiveness, including political variables such as international cooperation, prior relations between 
sender and target states, etc., as well as economic variables such as the average cost of sanctions, trade 
linkages, etc. This thesis attempts to make a contribution by exploring the role of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in sanctions regimes, as they have become the main actor in sanction implementation 
in the current globalized world. Given this context, there is a need to analyze the impact of sanctions on the 
profit maximization of firms, including the effect of the pressures applied by sender and target states to 
influence the implementation of sanctions by the MNCs. In exploring these issues, this thesis concludes that 
there is a factor that has generally been overlooked when analyzing the behavior of MNCs’ responses to 
sanctions—the level of governance in the target state. The level of governance in the target state 
determines the environment in which MNCs operate. Furthermore, this influence over the strategic choice 
planning on firms will help determine the MNCs’ decisions to either comply or evade the sanctions, 
eventually determining the level of sanctions effectiveness. This thesis has found both statistical and 
country case evidence in this regard, raising implications that could prove to be useful when designing and 
implementing economic sanctions in future cases.  
 
SECTION 1: Introduction 
  In recent decades, global leaders have begun to rely more heavily on economic 
sanctions to exert pressure on other nations. These tools of economic statecraft have most 
often been implemented through a ban on economic activity such as trade, but can come 
in a variety of forms as evidenced by the use of sanctions in earlier civilizations. They 
originated as one of the many elements of war, starting with the siege of ancient cities, 
before evolving into more sophisticated forms of restrictions such as economic blockades 
in the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe. During the 20th century, sanctions as legal 
barriers to international trade embodied a new avenue for countries to exert pressure on 
one another without the use of force. This allowed countries to send strong signals to the 
opposing countries without incurring significant costs or losing citizen lives in combat. 
These tools gained popularity after the new international order began in 1945, when 
countries began perceiving the use of force as a last resort and thus became less inclined 
to use these means whenever conflicts between countries arose.   
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             However, although sanctions hold several advantages over the use of force, they 
still hold many drawbacks that impede their effective use. They are difficult to manage 
and arduous to implement, thus calling into question their effectiveness. This is a critical 
issue that has received a great deal of attention. A vast literature has identified a number 
of political and economic variables that influence economic sanctions’ effectiveness, 
including international cooperation, prior relations between sender and target states, the 
average cost of sanctions, trade linkages, etc. More recently, several studies have begun 
to focus on the role of market forces behind sanctions effectiveness. These studies noted 
that globalization has brought the actions of the multinational corporations (MNCs) to the 
forefront, as they are now the leading actors in sanctions implementation. The decision of 
MNCs regarding whether or not to comply or evade a sanctions regime could hold 
important implications for their effectiveness.  Therefore, the conversation surrounding 
effectiveness has shifted from the actions of the state to those of the private sector.  
              This thesis seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussion of sanctions 
effectiveness, with a focus on the influence of governance in the target country on the 
decisions of MNCs regarding sanctions implementation. This is an important issue 
because as governments in sender countries exert pressure on MNCs to implement 
sanctions, governments in the target countries apply pressure on MNCs to prevent them 
from implementing these sanctions. Governance in the target country influences the 
balance between these pressures because it defines the environment in which MNCs 
operate, playing an important role in their profit maximization process. This process 
guides the strategic choice planning of firms, determining how sanctions are implemented 
and their eventual effectiveness. This study explores the role played by governance in the 
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target state in influencing sanctions effectiveness through the lens of MNC activity. 
Furthermore, it reaches the conclusion that there is a positive relationship between the 
level of governance in the target country and sanctions effectiveness. This conclusion has 
important implications for the design and implementation of economic sanctions.  
SECTION 2: Literature Review 
Economic sanctions have become an increasingly important tool in economic 
statecraft in recent decades. These instruments for conflict-resolution allow countries to 
exert pressure on other countries through the use of economic penalties. Their popularity 
reflects the belief that sanctions are a low-cost alternative to war when diplomacy fails, 
especially when compared to the high costs associated with the use of military force. As 
the increasing wartime technology develops and weapons of mass destruction provide an 
existential threat, it is becoming increasingly common to defer to other methods of 
statecraft such as economic sanctions.  However, the potential of economic sanctions is 
limited by questions surrounding their effectiveness.  
 While the definition of effectiveness may vary, a consensus seems to have 
emerged. As noted by Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg (“Hufbauer”) in Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered, the effectiveness of sanctions has two parts: (i) “the extent to 
which the policy result sought by the sender country was …achieved” and (ii) the 
“contribution to success made by sanctions” (49). According to these measures, they 
“found sanctions to be at least partially successful in 24 percent of the cases documented” 
even though they depended heavily on “the type of policy or governmental change 
sought” (158). Many scholars have relied on this database as a key data source in 
analyzing the effectiveness of sanctions; however, the database has been criticized by 
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some such as Robert A. Pape who question its accuracy. In Why Economic Sanctions Do 
Not Work, he disagrees with certain elements of the Hufbauer dataset, claiming that “an 
examination of the 40 cases in which Hufbauer claim economic sanctions were 
successful,” only yielded “5 clear successes” (99). According to his analysis, the 
“remainder are accounted for by 4 classes of errors: 18 were determined by force, not 
economic sanctions; 8 are failures, in which the target state never concede to the 
coercer’s demands; 6 are trade disputes, not instances of economic sanctions; and 3 are 
indeterminate” (101). Therefore, even though the “Hufbauer database has become the 
bedrock study on the effectiveness of economic sanctions,” playing a key role “in 
significant U.S. foreign policy debates such as whether to rely on sanctions instead of use 
force against Iraq in 1991,” it is important to keep in mind the limitations of these 
databases, as it is often difficult to delineate and properly track the influence of sanctions 
on the eventual concession of the target state.  
Given this context, the question arises as to exactly what factors influence this 
variation in sanctions effectiveness. Hufbauer et al. identify political and economic 
variables behind sanctions’ success or failure. On the political side, they look at factors 
including (i) companion policy measures, (ii) international cooperation, (iii) international 
assistance to the target country, (iv) prior relations between sender and target states, and 
(v) democracy vs. autocracy. On the economic side, they explore the effects of (i) the 
average cost of sanctions for the target state, (ii) country size, (iii) trade linkages, (iv) 
economic health, (v) political stability in the target country, and (vi) sanction type.  
At the same time, as the world evolves from one of fragmented blocks to a 
globalized whole, the structure of international relations changes as well as the channels 
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through which sanctions are implemented. This in turn requires a better understanding of 
the forces at play behind sanctions implementation, because it may lead to the emergence 
of new explanatory factors. In Globalization: What's New? What's Not?, Keohane and 
Nye refer to this phenomenon as “globalism” which involves “long-distance flows of 
goods, services, and capital, as well as the information and perception that accompany 
market exchange” (106). As the world emerged from World War II and worked together 
to build industrialism, “interdependence and globalism have become thicker, systemic 
relationships among different networks have become more important” and so there have 
been more “interconnections” (109). However, along with this change in transnational 
relationships with direct implications for the use of sanctions, comes a change in the most 
prominent actors in sanctions implementation.  
Much of the literature on sanctions stands on the presumption that sanctions are 
actions implemented directly by the government of the sender state. However, the 
evolving international economic environment with its increasingly interconnected and 
interdependent production networks has created a suitable environment for MNCs to 
become the lead actors in sanction implementation. As noted by Kenneth Rodman in 
Sanctions Beyond Borders, “multinational corporations, whose global spread and 
increasingly cosmopolitan outlook increased their independence from home 
governments,” transformed from simple “instruments of foreign policy” to “autonomous 
actors whose self-interstate behavior could undercut strategies of economic statecraft” 
(4)… “weakening the impact of trade controls because these subsidiaries are wholly 
inside the jurisdiction of another country and out of the control of security planners” (4-
5).  
As the preconceived notion that the state is the leading actor in sanctions’ 
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implementation is slowly changing, there is a need to address the impact of the rise of 
these transnational actors. According to Clifton Morgan and Navin Bapat in Imposing 
Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion, the sanctions literature “follows the 
argument that senders cut exchanges and impose costs on the target state” (65). They 
observe that “the exchange halted as a result of sanctions frequently does not occur 
between states” and instead occurs between “firms and the individuals of the sender and 
target state” which are forced to “absorb the cost of sanctions.” Given that the interests of 
the sender state and the firm can often diverge as the former seeks maximum impact from 
the sanctions while the latter seeks profit maximization, the “domestic actors of the 
sender” often “attempt to illegally continue economic exchanges with the target” through 
various means of circumvention such as “moving their operations to countries that allow 
exchange with the target or using offshore locations.” Morgan and Bapat explored these 
factors and developed a game theory model to help explain the different elements that go 
into the strategic choice planning of firms when deciding to comply or evade sanctions. 
They concluded that new factors such as (i) “the value a firm places on its economic 
exchange with a target state,” (ii) “the probability a firm will come under investigation 
for sanctions violations,” and (iii) “the level of the fine for sanctions violations,” all come 
into play during the decision making process of MNCs. It is only when MNCs assess the 
level of risk associated with evading the sanctions, the possible costs incurred with 
getting caught, and the forgone profits, that they can make an informed decision on 
whether or not to comply with the sanctions and follow the demands of the sender state. 
These studies show that the role played by governments in sender states has 
evolved from directly imposing export and import controls, to influencing MNCs to 
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implement the sanctions, and for this they have to take into account how MNCs operate. 
David Rowe in Manipulating the Market analyzes the economic costs of trade sanctions 
(boycotts and embargos), showing the deadweight loss involved. He explains that as trade 
volumes shift as a result of the sanctions, there will be price changes that will cause 
market inefficiencies in the target state (see Appendix). In responding to these changes, 
MNCs with operations in the target state have different strategies. According to Rowe, 
the exporters’ first strategy is to “persuade the target government to comply with the 
[sender state]’s… demands and cause sanctions to be lifted” in order to minimize the 
level of forgone profit caused by the sanctions regime (23). If this fails, they would 
attempt to “recover the windfall losses generated by sanctions” by pressuring the sender 
government, but their options in this regard are rather limited as it is unlikely that the 
sender government will fully compensate the firm for the forgone profits. Governments 
of sender states have a great deal of influence in this regard, because as stated by Rowe, 
“the government controls the state and thus holds a monopoly over the legitimate means 
of coercion,” and “the government … [has]… the means and legal authority to monitor 
and coerce [exporters] … individual behavior” (24).  
The actions available to the governments of the sender states to influence MNCs’ 
behavior in order to maximize the impact of sanctions have received a great deal of 
attention in the literature. However, it is first important to consider how the structure of 
an MNC could lead to divergence in action between the headquarters and the subsidiaries 
based in different countries, under different jurisdictions. As shown in Figure 1, 
economic activity by the MNC will reside in multiple countries, depending on the 
presence of foreign subsidiaries or local contractors. MNCs can have their headquarters 
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in the US, foreign subsidiaries in countries such as Japan, Germany, etc. and at the same 
time hold subcontractors in countries such as Bangladesh, in an effort to benefit from the 
cheaper labor and looser regulations.  
Figure 1. Typical Structure of an MNC Today 
 
When deciding how to design sanction regimes, governments now have a variety 
of options to choose from, including trade and investment restrictions, asset freezes, 
travel bans, etc. with the option of either imposing comprehensive or targeted sanctions. 
Furthermore, governments in the sender state can also extend the legal jurisdiction of the 
MNCs headquartered in the sender state to the foreign subsidiaries located abroad 
through extraterritorial controls, meaning that the foreign subsidiaries located in the 
target countries would become liable for the sanctions as a result of these controls. As 
Rodman explains, these extraterritorial controls have often been used, as in the case of 
Rhodesia in 1965. At the time, the country “appl[ied] its embargoes and export controls 
extraterritorially to cover the foreign subsidiaries of US firms and US-origin technology 
and know-how even after they left the US boundaries” (23).  These extraterritorial 
controls ensure that the sanctions hold a global reach, by making foreign subsidiaries 
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liable for sanctions compliance. In the presence of these controls, the sender state can 
impose penalties on foreign subsidiaries that fail to comply with the sanctions, therefore 
making it more difficult for foreign subsidiaries to avoid sanctions compliance. The goal 
of these controls is to influence the cost-benefit analysis of these foreign subsidiaries, 
creating strong incentives for MNCs and their subsidiaries to comply with sanctions. 
Along with these controls, sender states are now aware of the tools that they have at their 
disposal through the use of sanctions, and there has been a great focus of the literature on 
the actions of the sender state. 
However, there is less of an understanding of how these countries should tailor 
the sanctions to best fit the local considerations of the target state. There is a current gap 
in the literature that fails to explain how conditions in the target country influence the 
behavior of MNCs when deciding whether or not to comply with sanctions. Focusing on 
this gap could allow sender states to better utilize the various tools at their disposals when 
they enact economic sanctions, by seeking to exert the greatest impact on the strategic 
choice planning of firms. These targeted actions would influence the cost-benefit analysis 
of the MNCs and could eventually lead to their compliance of the sanctions, which is an 
integral element in determining the effectiveness of the sanctions regime as a whole. 
Therefore, sender states must not only consider the conditions of the target state, but also 
isolate certain key characteristics that will have the most influence on firm decisions. 
Given the ample variety of conditions in the target countries in terms of region, size, level 
of GDP, and many other indicators, the foreign subsidiaries of MNCs will inevitably 
react differently to the imposition of sanctions in different target states, as states are 
increasingly more likely to intervene in the activity of foreign subsidiaries located in their 
country. According to the Yves Doz and C.K. Prahalad in How MNCs Cope with Host 
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Government Intervention, in “recent years, the efforts of host governments to maintain 
control over their own national economies have increasingly restricted the freedom of 
MNC managers in deploying economic resources” as well as “have often interfered with 
the autonomous process of strategy formation” (414). These limitations to strategic 
freedom have “primarily affected multinationals in the form of such locally sensitive 
issues as product/market choice, use of technology, level of employment, and national 
trade balance.” Therefore, the power that the target states use as conditions for the foreign 
subsidiary to be located in their country can heavily influence the MNCs’ cost-benefit 
analysis, affecting the way they attempt to maximize profits.  
However, in linking how conditions in the target state influence sanctions 
effectiveness, the current studies in the literature generally fail to explore the dynamic 
between the target state and MNCs’ activity, disregarding its importance. One exception 
is a study by Risa Brooks in Sanctions and Regime Types, What Works and When, which 
looks at the relationship between government regime type in the target country and the 
effectiveness of sanctions. In the article, Brooks concludes that sanctions are more 
effective when the target country is democratic rather than authoritarian. This conclusion 
is based only on political considerations, namely that the leaders in democratic countries 
are more vulnerable to the complaints of those affected by the sanctions. As public 
opinion plays an important role in maintaining those in power, the suffering of the 
leaders’ constituents as a result of the sanctions will likely have more teeth, influencing 
leaders to concede to demands more easily. This is not necessarily the case in autocratic 
regimes, where the leadership lacks a degree of accountability to the constituents and 
does not feel the need to rectify the situation in order to maintain their hold on power. 
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Furthermore, due to the government’s strong influence over the media, they are more 
easily able to hide the suffering of their people from other nations that could have 
otherwise put pressure on the government. Therefore, Brooks suggests that in an effort to 
make sanctions more effective, the nature of the sanctions should be tailored to the 
specific considerations of each target state involved. For example, if dealing with an 
autocratic regime with low levels of governance, it would be a more reasonable approach 
to enact specific, targeted sanctions in the form of travel bans, asset freezes, etc. directed 
at the top leaders in the state and not necessarily enact them on the entire population. On 
the other hand, when dealing with a more democratic form of government where the 
population could heavily influence leadership through their voting power, comprehensive 
sanctions would be more likely to hold and lead to concessions from the target state. 
Therefore, Brooks proposes to design an effective sanctions regime based on not only the 
goals of the sender state but also on the regime type of the target state.   
Another important work that focuses on conditions in the target state is the 
seminal study of Hufbauer. In particular, they focused on economic health and political 
stability of the target state and found that these “variables are mixed and weaker than 
expected, and (they) believe that this area would benefit from further research” (99). 
Although these studies have drawn attention to the conditions in the target state as 
determinants of sanctions effectiveness, their approach is macro and traditional, failing to 
explore how conditions in the target state affect the new channels through which 
sanctions are implemented. Given the rising prominence of the actions of the MNCs in 
determining sanctions success, it is important to properly analyze how MNCs will change 
their reactions to economic sanctions due to the environment they face in the target state. 
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This is an important gap in the literature, because in a globalized world, MNCs are the 
ones that implement sanctions, and sanctions effectiveness will depend to a large extent 
on the factors that guide MNC actions and their reactions to the imposition of sanctions. 
This paper attempts to make a contribution toward closing this gap by exploring how 
conditions in the target country, namely governance, influence sanctions effectiveness 
through the way they affect how MNCs implement sanctions.  
SECTION 3: Research Question and Hypothesis 
 When analyzing the conditions in the target country that influence the profit-
maximizing decisions of MNCs, the literature has already analyzed the impact of a 
number of variables, as discussed above. However, there are other factors that have not 
yet been explored in the literature. In this context, this thesis will discuss sanctions 
effectiveness by focusing on the reaction of MNCs. As MNC behavior is guided by profit 
maximization, bringing into the discussion the environment in which these MNCs operate 
in the target country is of critical importance.  One of the most important factors that 
determine this environment is governance.  
In the “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” the World Bank defines governance 
as “consist[ing] of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes the “process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them.” More specifically, this idea of governance can be 
presented into quantifiable measures that include “voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
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law, and control of corruption.” As such, governance reflects the quality of the legal 
system in the country, including the scope, reach, modernity, stability, and simplicity of 
the laws, the respect for the rule of law, and the quality of the judiciary system. 
Furthermore, governance also encompasses the quality of the regulatory system, the 
absence of corruption, and the quality of the institutions in the country.  Consisting with 
this definition, the United Nations stated “good governance assures that corruption is 
minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most 
vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making.” This definition makes clear that 
governance in the target state helps determines to a large extent the environment in which 
MNCs operate when applying sanctions, and raises the possibility that governance plays 
a large role in explaining how MNCs react to the given stimulus associated with the 
imposition of sanctions. 
Thus, the research question of this thesis is as follows: In a world with 
interdependent production networks and powerful MNCs, how do the characteristics of 
the target state, in particular its level of governance, influence MNCs to either comply or 
evade economic sanctions, leading to a causal relationship between governance and 
sanctions effectiveness?  
To answer this question, this study focuses on MNC behavior, as MNCs operating 
in the target countries are the ones that implement sanctions in a globalized world. Their 
actions following the imposition of sanctions are the critical drivers of the final 
effectiveness of sanctions. MNCs are guided by profit maximization, which in turn is 
heavily influenced by the environment in which they operate in the target state. Among 
the factors that determine this environment in the target state, the governance level will 
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be crucial as it defines the rules of the game for the MNCs as they implement sanctions. 
Therefore, there are valid reasons to expect that a relationship exists between governance 
in the target state and sanctions effectiveness.  
 To analyze the relationship between governance in the target state and sanctions 
effectiveness, this note relies on a three-pronged approach, including: (i) a logical 
analysis, (ii) a quantitative testing of the hypotheses, and (iii) specific country cases. 
SECTION 4: Logical Analysis 
  This section discusses the link between the level of governance in the target 
country and sanctions effectiveness from an analytical point of view, by dissecting how 
sanctions are implemented by MNCs.  
As presented in equation (1) below, there are many factors that explain sanctions 
effectiveness (E), such as the size of the sender country (a), size of the target country (b), 
trade linkages (c), types of sanctions (d), political stability in the target state (e), etc.  
These factors have been analyzed in detail by many scholars such as Hufbauer et.al, but 
this thesis proposes an additional variable that could be playing an important role in 
determining sanctions effectiveness: the governance in the target country (G).  
               (1)             E= f (a, b, c, d, e….,G) 
   
To understand why governance plays a role in determining sanctions 
effectiveness, it is important to start with the fact that sanctions are intrinsically linked to 
international trade, which is largely dominated by the actions of MNCs. Since MNCs 
often act as the main players in the implementation of sanctions, the variables that 
influence their behavior will be key for explaining sanctions effectiveness.  
              Since MNCs are profit-maximizing entities, their strategic choices depend on the 
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net impact of these sanctions on their profits. Sanctions adversely affect the profits of the 
MNCs because the loss of a trading partner decreed by the sanctions is equivalent to the 
imposition of a production quota on the MNC, which limits its production to a level 
below its profit maximizing equilibrium. As a result, profits fall because with a price 
determined at international markets, the MNC cannot raise its prices to compensate for 
the loss in quantity sold. The MNC could try to allocate its idle capacity to produce for 
alternative markets; however this substitution is not always possible as it is difficult and 
costly to gain access to new markets. Under these circumstances, the MNCs have an 
incentive not to comply with the sanctions in order to maintain their previous level of 
profits (the profit maximizing level), by continuing to produce or sell its production in the 
sanctioned country. The government of the sender country is aware of this, and pressures 
the MNC to comply with the sanctions through the threat of penalties for noncompliance. 
In their cost-benefit analysis, the MNCs need to consider these additional costs imposed 
on the firm for evading the sanctions, which could move the needle in the direction of 
complying with them. However, target states are also aware of this dynamic, and they 
would therefore attempt to counter the actions of the sender country by threatening 
penalties on the MNCs for complying with the sanctions.  The effect of these two 
opposing forces and the way they interact contribute to the way MNCs implement 
sanctions, and ultimately to sanctions’ effectiveness.  
           The discussion above can be summarized in a simple equation that represents the 
net costs faced by MNCs after the imposition of a sanctions regime:  
             (2) NC = FP + S + T 
where:  
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NC are the net costs a sanctions regime for the MNCs, 
FP are the profits forgone for implementing sanctions, because sanctions force the MNCs 
to produce less than the level associated with the maximization of profits, 
S are the cost of penalties imposed by the sender state on firms for not implementing the 
sanctions, as the sender state seeks to force MNCs to implement these sanctions, and 
T are the cost of penalties imposed by the target state on firms for implementing the 
sanctions as it seeks to force MNCs not to implement sanctions imposed on the country. 
 MNCs fully implementing sanctions forego FP profits and pay T penalties to the 
target state; hence the cost they face is FP + T. If sanctions are not implemented at all by 
the MNC, it does not forego any profits (FP=0), but has to pay the penalty imposed by 
the sender state, S.  Based on this equation, the target state would try to influence the 
actions of the MNCs by increasing T (or reducing the value of S if it can) so as to make 
sure that FP+T is always higher than S, thus providing an incentive for the MNC not to 
implement sanctions. Partial compliance with sanctions would result in MNCs paying 
some penalties to the target state (T), as well as to the sender state (S), and foregoing 
some profits (FP). 
           The crucial issue to keep in mind at this stage of the analysis is that while 
governments impose notional penalties, the actual penalty paid by the MNCs will depend 
on the enforcement of that penalty. Only if governments have an accurate assessment of 
whether sanctions are being implemented or not, will they be able to enforce a penalty on 
the MNC. Hence, the ability of governments to enforce these penalties depends on their 
ability to monitor sanctions implementation. This in turn is heavily influenced by the 
level of governance in the target state, which affects the governments’ ability to enforce 
 
penalties in a manner that is consistent with the actual implementation of sanctions. 
These elements are key in the strategic planning of the firms, 
cost they face from a sanctions regime, as they go about deciding how much of the 
sanctions to implement. It is at this level that governance in the target state becomes a 
major determinant of the strategic choices made by MNCs. 
When deciding how to implement sanctions, MNCs seek to minimize the net 
costs from sanctions depicted in equation (2)
explores how the MNCs try to minimize these costs, and provides a logical framework 
showing the underpinnings of the direct relationship between governance in the target 
state and sanctions effectiveness, as shown below.
Link 1: The relationship between governance and
the level of foregone profit is a critical link in the causal mechanism connecting 
governance and sanctions effectiveness. 
a) Impact of governance in
by the sender state (S)
implement sanctions is key in the ability of sender countries to enforce the 
penalties they have announced (S). This environment is determined to a large 
extent by the level of governance. The level of corruption, the exi
informal markets, the strength of institutions and the level of transparency in the 
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target state affect the ability of the sender country to monitor how the MNCs are 
implementing sanctions. When governance in the target state is strong (low 
corruption, no informal markets, strong institutions, high transparency, etc.), 
MNCs operate in a market with free flow of information, which makes it easier 
for the sender state to assess how sanctions are implemented and what are the 
foregone profits associated with them. However, when the level of governance in 
the target country is weak, with high corruption, prevalence of informal markets, 
weak institutions, poor transparency, etc., MNCs have many avenues to evade 
sanctions undetected from the sender state. The lack of knowledge held by the 
sender state about the actual implementation of sanctions by the MNCs reduces 
the actual value of the net cost that the MNCs face as a result of the sanctions 
regime. Under these circumstances, the sender government cannot apply a level of 
S that accurately matches the evasion of sanctions, and the actual value of S faced 
by the MNCs differs significantly from the theoretical values intended by the 
governments. If sanctions evasion is undetected, the actual value of S is 
significantly below what the sender government intended, and weak governance 
in the target state makes this possible. In sum, the status of governance in the 
target state determines to a large extent the real cost for the MNCs of 
implementing or evading sanctions, as depicted in equation (2).  This is the first 
and more critical link in the chain that relates governance and the effectiveness of 
sanctions. Without strong monitoring of penalties by the sender state, the 
enforcement of sanctions is severely compromised, affecting the implementation 
by MNCs. 
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b) Impact of governance in the target state on the actual value of the penalties 
imposed by the target state (T): Governance in the target state also affects the 
target country’s ability to monitor how the MNCs are applying sanctions, thus 
affecting their ability to enforce their own penalties T on MNCs for complying 
with sanctions. When governance in the target state is weak, the capacity to 
monitor the actions by MNCs is also low in theory. Hence, the enforcement of the 
penalties by the target state (T) would also be weak. This raises the possibility 
that MNCs could implement sanctions without incurring the penalties from the 
target state. However, if target governance is weak, target states can resort to 
other informal channels to ensure that MNCs do not apply sanctions, for instance 
by applying the theoretical level of T penalty regardless of what they know about 
actual sanction implementation. This would occur because in a target state with 
low levels of governance, there is no institution from where to seek protection 
against government actions. On the other hand, when governance in the target 
state is strong, then the sender state will have the ability to monitor sanctions 
implementation and would be in a better position to enforce penalties S that are 
accurately linked to this implementation level. The target state also has the ability 
to monitor what the MNCs are doing and can apply penalties that are better linked 
to the implementation of sanctions as well.  
c) Impact of governance in target state on the actual value of foregone profits (FP): 
Governance is a major determinant of the environment where the MNCs operate, 
and it determines to a large extent their ability to generate profits. As discussed by 
Paolo Mauro in Corruption and Growth, respect for the law, strong and 
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predictable regulatory environment, absence of corruption and strong institutions, 
allow MNCs to operate with flexibility and long-term horizons. On the other 
hand, weak institutions disrespect for the law and pervasive corruption foster 
economic waste and inefficiencies that hinder firm’s profits. As governance 
impacts the level of profits that can be achieved in the economy, it also affects the 
potential foregone profits from a sanctions regime (higher levels of governance 
implies higher foregone profits from sanctions and vice versa). However, this 
impact is offset by the fact that governments in countries with weak governance 
could help subsidiaries of MNCs avoid the impact of foregone profits (e.g., 
through smuggling, sanctions busters or bribes). This would allow them to create 
new avenues for the MNCs to reach their previous levels of profits, and reduce 
the level of FP. Therefore, by helping MNCs to evade sanctions undetected, weak 
governance also minimizes the value of foregone profits. 
Link 2: The discussion above makes it clear that the level of governance in the target 
state affects the balance of costs imposed by governments as they try to influence the 
MNCs in implementing sanctions as well as the foregone profits. As presented in the 
equation (2), the balance of net costs faced by MNCs following the imposition of 
sanctions will depend on the actual enforcement of penalties T and S and on the level of 
foregone profits FP. As discussed above, the actual values of FP, T, and S are heavily 
influenced by the conditions of governance in the target state, thus the governance level 
also affects the final balance between these factors. The strategic decision of the MNCs 
of how much to implement sanctions will be determined by the relative weight of the 
actual enforcement of S and T, as well as by FP. As equation (2) outlines, MNCs will 
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have a greater incentive to implement sanctions if the cost imposed by the sender state for 
not implementing sanctions (S) is high and exceeds the sum of foregone profits (FP), and 
the cost of penalties imposed by the target state for implementing the sanctions (T). This 
would mean that the MNC would rather comply with the sanctions in order to avoid 
having to incur the costs of the penalties for failing to comply with the sanctions, as they 
outweigh the forgone profit levels. 
Link 3: The strategic decisions of the MNCs regarding the implementation of sanctions 
will largely determine the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. This is due to their role 
as the main actor behind sanctions implementation, as previously explained. 
In conclusion, MNCs operating in target countries with strong governance are 
likely to implement sanctions in a manner that is different from the implementation of 
sanctions by MNCs operating in countries where governance is weak, because they 
would be facing different net actual costs for implementing the sanctions. Thus, there is a 
logical reason to conclude that a relationship does exist between governance and sanction 
effectiveness, which can be further explained by MNC activity in the target state. 
The question then becomes what kind of influence does governance in the target 
state have on the ability of target and sender states to influence the decisions of the 
MNCs regarding the implementation of sanctions? The answer to this question relies on 
the assumption that stronger governance in the target state leaves MNCs more vulnerable 
to the reach of the sender state. In countries with stronger governance, information flows 
more easily and is readily available for not only the sender state but also for the 
international community as well. Moreover, there is no corruption to facilitate back 
channels to evade sanctions unnoticed, and the target state does not have unbounded 
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powers to coerce the MNCs to evade sanctions unlike countries with low governance 
where a direct link between governments and MNCs is more likely. This allows for the 
creation of a hypothesis regarding the original research question. Contrary to what may 
seem at first intuitive, stronger governance in the target country tends to make MNCs less 
vulnerable to the target state and more vulnerable to the sender state. Therefore, strong 
governance in the target country would tend to be associated with more effective 
sanctions, implying that the relationship is positive. 
  The same conclusion is reached when governance in the target country is weak. 
In this case, this would mean that the MNC was influenced by the government of the 
target state to evade the sanctions. This requires S to be lower than the sum of FP and T. 
In this scenario, due to the weak governance in the target country, the sender state’s 
government finds it very difficult to apply penalties on MNCs for not complying with the 
sanctions. Information does not flow as well in these cases and there is corruption that 
allows countries to evade sanctions unnoticed, both factors reducing S, while the MNCs 
in this case are less protected from the actions of the target government because 
institutions are weak. Therefore, this would allow for greater levels of T and lower levels 
of S, making the cost of complying (FP + T) higher than the cost of not complying (S). 
The result is that sanctions would not be as effective in target countries where governance 
is weak. Again, the relationship between governance and sanction effectiveness is 
positive.  
This analytical discussion provides logical support for the existence of a positive 
link between governance in the target country and sanctions effectiveness through the 
profit maximizing operations of MNCs. However, it must be supported through a 
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statistical analysis as well as country case studies. 
SECTION 5: Statistical Analysis 
          The second leg of the research is a statistical test of the link between governance in 
the target state and sanctions effectiveness. This is a very preliminary test, subject to 
many weaknesses, mainly due to the lack of formal theoretical model of MNCs profit-
maximizing behavior linking governance in the target state and sanctions effectiveness. 
The design of such a full-fledged model and statistical analysis is an undertaking that is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, while some data for sanctions effectiveness is 
available in Hufbauer et al., it is not nearly as well developed as it is needed for 
conducting the advanced econometrics tests that would be required, such as a more 
sophisticated logit analysis which was first tried by Long and Freese. These authors used 
“logit modes… to estimate the likelihood of successful outcome [for sanctions] based on 
the values of the independent variables.” As recognized by Hufbauer et al, the use of 
these techniques to predict the success or failure of economic sanctions “still lies beyond 
the grasp…of modern econometric methods.”  
Instead, this paper follows the guidance provided by Hufbauer et al and conducts 
a weak test of the link between governance and sanction effectiveness, with the view to 
“find[ing] some basis for the power of key individual variables to explain the 
effectiveness of sanctions.”  
  When structuring the regression, the following variables were considered: 
Dependent variable:  Sanctions’ effectiveness, as defined by an index calculated by 
Hufbauer et al, which ranges from 0 to 16. However, this index only captures the 
sanctions episodes up until 2000. For the more recent sanctions episodes, Hufbauer 
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included a more qualitative account of the success, categorizing the sanctions as 
successful, unsuccessful, or inconclusive. In order to include these sanctions regimes into 
the data, the most recent sanctions were classified as 0, 1, or 2 according to the level of 
success. Then, this information was comingled with the Hufbauer dataset, and sanctions 
with scores 0-6 in Hufbauer et al. were given a 0 (ineffective), scores 7-9 were given a 1 
(inconclusive), and scores 10-16 were given a 2 (effective).  
Independent variable: Governance, as measured by the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) developed by the World Bank for 215 countries. The regression was 
also run against two of the sub-components or dimensions of governance that are key 
determinants of MNC behavior. Out of the dimensions including: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and freedom from corruption, for the purpose of this 
thesis, the dimensions that are analyzed are regulatory quality and freedom from 
corruption. Each independent variable was assessed against the level of effectiveness as 
outlined in the 0, 1, 2 scale with the following results.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sanctions Effectiveness vs. Governance in Target State 
 
 
Figure 3. Sanctions Effectiveness vs. Regulatory Quality in Target State 
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Figure 4. Sanctions Effectiveness vs. Freedom from Corruption in Target State 
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As shown in the graphs above, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model does not 
work properly for this data, as the dependent variable is not normally distributed. 
Therefore, this test uses a univariate logit regression, with governance in the target state 
and two of its sub-components (regulatory quality and freedom from corruption) as 
further explanatory variables for sanctions effectiveness. This type of regression could 
properly account for the categorical dependent variables that correct for the lack of a 
normal distribution in the dependent variables.  
                The regression results are described below, using the generalized linear models 
(glm) function that provides the ordinal logit function: 
 
 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr (>|t|)  
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Intercept 0.155244 0.2072164 0.749 0.457 
Governance 0.0023825 0.0009986 2.386 0.021 
 
According to the regression, the relationship between governance and sanctions 
effectiveness is small and positive, as indicated by the Beta of 0.002385. Since it has a p 
value of 0.021, a statistically significant result at the 5% level, this indicates that the 
relationship is not due to statistical errors alone. It is interesting to note that the regression 
on the level of governance of the target state vis-à-vis the effectiveness of the sanctions 
shows a statistically significant result. The sign provides some statistical support, though 
weak, for the thesis that there is a positive linkage between governance and sanctions 
effectiveness.  
There are many different ways to try to strengthen the results, especially by 
adding other variables to the regression, but none of those attempted produced results that 
were significantly stronger than the one presented above.  A reason for this could be that 
governance is related to the other explanatory variables, generating a multicollinearity 
problem. While there are ways to test for the existence of this problem, no comprehensive 
test was conducted. This is the case because while there were some preliminary 
indications of a relationship between governance and these other explanatory variables, 
the causality between them could not be properly identified. Under these circumstances, 
it was decided to limit the statistical analysis to the result presented above. 
In sum, the statistical analysis supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship 
exists between governance in the target state and sanctions effectiveness, although it must 
be acknowledged that the conclusion is relatively weak from a statistical point of view. In 
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any case, while not conclusive, these results allow for the possibility that a positive 
relationship does exist between governance in the target state and sanction effectiveness.  
SECTION 6: Case Studies 
The third leg of the study focuses on two country cases of sanctions with varying 
degrees of governance in the target state. The analysis focuses on how the particular 
characteristics of governance in the target states affected the profit maximization of 
MNCs and led them to implement sanctions in a manner consistent with the hypothesis of 
this thesis, i.e., confirming or refuting that governance and sanctions effectiveness are 
positively related.   
   The cases to be analyzed are (1) the sanctions imposed by the US on South 
Africa in 1986 and (2) the sanctions imposed by the US on Iran in 1995. 
Methodology:  For each country case, this section analyzes how the MNCs 
reacted to sanctions in the context of the governance in the target states. The analysis 
starts by providing background information of the target country before sanctions were 
introduced, including a description of the political and economic situation at the time, the 
government regime in place and the status of governance in the country. The following 
sub-sections focus on the nature of the sanctions that were enacted and the way the 
MNCs responded to them. The analysis follows the lines of the arguments provided in the 
analytical section above and the equation (2) to test whether they are supported or not in 
these specific cases. In particular, the theoretical arguments linking governance in the 
target country and the three variables (FP, S, and T) that determine how MNCs react to 
the sanctions are analyzed to find whether there is evidence to confirm the positive link 
between governance and sanctions effectiveness as shown by the statistical analysis.  
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When considering these arguments and applying them to the relevant case studies, 
particularly emphasis is placed on how the relationship between governance and sanction 
effectiveness is affected by a number of variables, including in particular  (i) the level of 
private sector independence, (ii) the role of market forces, (iii) the strength of the 
penalties enacted by the sender state, (iv) the strength of the penalties enacted by the 
target state, and (v) the impact of governance on foregone profits in implementing 
sanctions.  Each case concludes with comments on the (vi) relative MNC compliance 
levels and effectiveness of the sanctions regime. 
South Africa 
 This case explores the sanctions imposed by the United States on South Africa in 
1985-1986 during the apartheid regime, which is an interesting example of sanctions 
applied to a target country with a relatively strong level of governance. This case is 
characterized by (i) a high level of private sector independence, (ii) high prevalence of 
market forces, (iii) strong penalties for evasion of the sanctions enacted by the sender 
state on the MNCs, (iv) low impact of the penalties for compliance of sanctions enacted 
by the target state, (v) level of foregone profits not sufficient to force MNCs to comply 
with the sanctions, (vi) a high level of MNC compliance and eventual effectiveness of the 
sanctions 
Background Information 
             South Africa is a country located in the southern tip of the African continent. A 
former British colony, South Africa is the 25
th
 largest country in the world, both in terms 
of land and population, which exceeds 50 million people, 80 percent of which are of 
black origin. Its GDP at the time of the sanctions was around US$ 300 billion, ranking 
90
th
 in the world, reflecting the poverty and disenfranchisement that affected its black 
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population as a result of the apartheid regime. This regime was introduced in 1948 and 
institutionalized racial segregation, granting most political and economic power to the 
white minority. This not only kept the black population suppressed and struggling with 
poverty, but also institutionalized the marginalization of this segment of society. 
Governance Level 
 When assessing the case of South Africa, it is first important to outline the level 
of governance during apartheid, which according to the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, was relatively high compared to most other target states. Although this may 
seem counterintuitive given the absence of certain liberties and rights as dictated by 
apartheid, the assessment of the degree of governance in this case is stripped of ideology 
and instead focuses on the structure of the governance at hand. In fact, there is a 
consensus in the literature that governance level for South Africa at the time of apartheid 
was relatively strong compared to other target states subject to sanctions. Furthermore, 
South Africa not only ranked relatively high in terms of the overall level of governance, 
but also ranked high in the two key elements that are especially relevant for MNC 
activity—freedom from corruption and respect for the rule of law. South Africa 
maintained low levels of corruption and a strong regulatory framework. The consensus in 
the literature points to this characterization as well. 
 According to After Apartheid by Ian Shapiro and Kahreen Tebeau, if one “ignored 
the ideology and focused on the formal feature of apartheid legal order, …[South Africa] 
replicated the constitutional structure of the British legal order” (234). When assessing 
governance with respect to the institutions present within society and the rule of law, 
South Africa had the same characteristics as Great Britain during the apartheid regime. 
As Shapiro and Tebeau explain, the “politicians from the political party with the majority 
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of seats formed the government and governed only as long as….they enjoyed the 
confidence of the majority of parliamentarians” (234). Furthermore, the assessment of the 
relative rule of law present in South Africa does not focus on whether or not the laws set 
by the government were deemed as morally acceptable or not, but instead on whether the 
principle of legality was followed. In South Africa, an “independent judiciary had the 
task of interpreting the law and so could determine when government officials were 
acting within the scope of the authority delegated by the legislature, but did not have the 
authority to invalidate statutes” (234). Furthermore, not only did the “apartheid legal 
order acknowledge the supremacy of the constitution, but the virtue of the kind of 
constitution it acknowledged also established the rule of law” (235). Therefore, South 
Africa maintained an independent judicial system that was not tainted by overt 
government involvement, and instead allowed for legal principles to guide their legal 
decisions.  
 This respect for the rule of law also implied that corruption levels were relative 
low. As Jonathan Hyslop explains in Political Corruption: Before and after Apartheid, 
although there were high patronage levels, “corruption was somewhat constrained by the 
legal fetishism that was characteristic of Afrikaner nationalist ideology in this period” 
(781). This would mean that “even the most dire apartheid measures were carried through 
with punctilious legal formalism, and the actions of civil servants were scrutinized by 
their superiors with this in mind” (781). Given these elements, it can be inferred that the 
relative governance for the apartheid regime was higher than other target states affected 
by sanctions regimes. 
 Finally, South Africa maintained a regulatory system of the highest caliber in 
support of their efforts to keep in place the apartheid system. As explained by William H. 
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Kaempfer in The Economics of the Call for Anti-Apartheid Investment Sanctions, the 
apartheid system “traditionally consisted of two distinct principles”: (i) “political doctrine 
of separation that permits blacks to own land only in the African reserves (homelands) 
and that allows blacks temporary residence in white areas” according to their 
employment and (ii) the principle that “white labor in the industrial work force should be 
protected from black competition” (529). In order to maintain these principles, the South 
African government implemented various policies such as the “homelands policy” that 
diverted “black urbanization away from ‘white’ cities toward distant dormitory towns 
from which in-migration for black workers is costly” (529). Furthermore, a “chief 
instrument of regulation” that served “both principles” was the “system of influx control 
or ‘passes,’ which constrained black mobility, since passes were based on employment 
and all hiring had to be approved by state-run labor bureaus.” According to Kaempfer, 
the “very existence of apartheid regulations, which embrace a comprehensive set of 
restrictions on black labor mobility, residential property rights and social interactions, 
gives clear evidence of state intervention in the market” (469). Interestingly, within these 
strict rules set by the government, the markets were allowed to function with relative 
freedom. Therefore, the South African government maintained a strong institutional 
framework with strict regulations that had to be followed by all members of society and 
which were strictly enforced. 
Market Environment before Sanctions 
Despite the strong regulation, South Africa was far from a planned economy as 
market forces were allowed to guide economic developments. As Rodman explains in 
Sanctions Against South Africa, MNCs subsidiaries were increasingly focusing on their 
self-interest and profit maximization in the domestic market as they not only 
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“increasingly objected to and resisted the injection of foreign policy considerations into 
their business dealings” but “as overseas operations became more important to the firm, 
its managers came to identify more closely with host country rather than home country 
aims” (317). Therefore, before the sanctions were enacted, “corporate officials 
characterized their South African operations as apolitical and contended that they were 
[unfairly] being held responsible for injustices beyond their control” (317). Therefore, 
MNCs operated largely in a market friendly environment. 
The Nature of the Sanctions 
According to Joseph Hanlon in Successes and Future Prospects of Sanctions 
Against South Africa, sanctions to penalize South Africa for the apartheid regime started 
as early as 1977, following the “1976 Soweto uprising.” The “massacre of the children in 
Soweto led directly to the sports boycott and the compulsory arms embargo imposed by 
the UN Security Council in 1977” (84). These sanctions were followed years later by 
more sanctions as “new uprisings inside South Africa in 1984 triggered new economic 
sanctions against the apartheid state in 1985 and 1986, particularly financial sanctions 
imposed by international banks and trade sanctions imposed by the US” (84). Thereafter, 
Nordic states “banned nearly all trade with South Africa,” as many other states that began 
banning various commodities coming from South Africa. According to Hanlon, “Ireland 
banned South African fruit, France banned South African coal, etc. The Commonwealth 
(except Britain) banned the import of coal, steel, and agricultural products” while the 
“existing arms, oil and cultural bans were tightened” (88). Moreover, sanctions 
permeated the financial markets as international funds were pressured to divest from 
South Africa and “international banks refused to make new loans, and also refused to roll 
over (renew) old loans, leading to South Africa defaulting and refusing to pay its debts.” 
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The sanctions were considerable. It is estimated that the US Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act resulted in a reduction in US trade with South Africa by $1.5 billion per 
year (88), with a cost to the country equivalent to 3 percent of GDP per year in the 1970s 
and 1990s (15). This would suggest that MNCs complied with the sanctions, as trade 
decreased substantially. However, further analysis is needed on the decision of MNCs to 
either comply with or evade the sanctions given the relative levels of penalties, 
incentives, and forgone profits. 
MNCs Behavior after the Sanctions 
The South African government went to a considerable length to induce firms to 
evade the sanctions. As Rodman explains, the “Protection of Business Act, which barred 
firms from releasing information about their operations without government approval, 
prevent[ed] South African private firms…from revealing relevant information” (211). 
This created obstacles for the sender state in implementing the sanctions as it made it 
more difficult for them to properly track the evaders of the sanctions. This in turn reduced 
the probability of MNCs being caught. Furthermore, under the “National Supplies 
Procurement Act, the South African government was able to commandeer any goods and 
services produced in South Africa regardless of a company’s intentions” (209). 
Therefore, they were able to demand certain goods from companies that were subsidiaries 
of American MNCs, without the company being legally responsible for selling the goods 
under US laws, therefore “calling into question any commitment made by American 
firms to prevent the illegal end-use of their production.” In other words, this Act 
“shield[ed] the companies from legal liability” since they “bore no responsibility for end-
use unless they knew of its destination beforehand.” This allowed the foreign subsidiaries 
of US firms to keep selling products in South Africa without the liability associated with 
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the sanctions. These various initiatives show how the South African government was 
attempting to shield firms located in the country from the possible costs that the sender 
state could impose for the violations of sanctions. Therefore, MNCs faced a reduction in 
the cost of penalties imposed by the sender state for violating sanctions (S) and an 
increase in the cost of the penalties imposed by the target state for complying with them 
(T), increasing the incentives for MCNs to avoid sanctions.  
Surprisingly, however, MNCs did not take full advantage of these measures and 
did not evade sanctions as much as possible. This development can be explained by the 
impact of governance not on the costs imposed by the sender and the target states for 
violating or complying with sanctions S and T, respectively, but on the other variable, FP, 
the foregone profits associated with sanctions. The particularly characteristics of South 
Africa, especially its market- friendly environment and open trade economy led MNCs to 
focus on the long-term consequences on their profits from evading sanctions. This was 
brought to the forefront because of the role played by interest groups, both domestically 
and abroad.   
Soon after sanctions were enacted, MNCs began to be pressured not only by 
sender and target governments, but also by the local population, as well as by foreign 
interest groups as the inhumanity of the apartheid regime began to be better understood 
by the world at large. In other words, the imposition of sanctions galvanized interest 
groups further, which exerted pressure for more sanctions in an ever increasing 
movement that had an effect on MNCs’ strategic decisions about whether to evade 
sanctions or not.  
In order to better understand this development and their effects on MNCs 
operations, it is important to establish the relationship between interest groups and the 
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sanctions regime. In Anton Lowenberg’s The Origins and Demise of South African 
Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis, he analyzes the impact of sanctions on domestic 
interest groups, focusing on the relationship between sanctions and strikes of black 
workers. Using a “vector-auto regression model the time-series analysis shows that an 
increase in sanctions had an immediate positive effect on the number of black workers on 
strike” (192). They also found that  “there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that 
foreign sanctions, at least in the short run, helped domestic opposition groups organize 
collective action among their members.” The sanctions brought together the international 
community against the wrongdoings of the South African government, creating a solid 
foundation for organizations within South Africa to consolidate and form a coalition with 
the international actors to put pressure on their government. 
The respect for the rule of law, regardless of how immoral, allowed for the 
emergence of local interest groups, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and other 
activist organizations. Although the government of South Africa attempted to oppress 
these organizations within the boundaries of their legal system once they realized that 
they were a threat to their power, the creation of these organizations would have been a 
more arduous process under regimes with weaker governance. As stated in Industrial 
Relations in South Africa by Sonia Bendix, the early 1980s saw “the establishment of 
unions which found their power not only in shop floor organizations but also in gaining 
the support of the community” (190). The government had created an environment that 
was hostile to the creation of such organizations, and in an effort to live up to the high 
levels of regulatory quality, would even meet with certain unions. For instance, in 
“August 1981 and April 1982 representatives of the then emergent unions came together 
in Cape Town to discuss trade union unity” (192). Unlike other more autocratic regimes, 
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the government at that time still wanted to portray as a country with high legal principles 
that accepted different organizations including labor unions. However, as these unions 
created the impetus for the eventual UDF and activist movements against apartheid, the 
government eventually oppressed these organizations, as they became threats to their 
power. Nevertheless, these organizations were able to use their transnational 
characteristics to gain support internationally and make it more costly for the MNCs to 
evade sanctions in South Africa. 
  Under these circumstances, resisting sanctions and not complying with the 
international pressure against the apartheid raised major opposition and put the long-term 
profits of the MNCs at risk. As noted by Lowemberg, MNCs operating in South Africa 
during this time were  “forced to devote resources to defending and justifying a continued 
presence there” as furor grew abroad and some firms even had “certain corporate 
employees work[ing] full time on the South Africa issue, managing relations with 
concerned external stakeholders” (1635). As a result, many firms decided to do away 
with business with South Africa as “by withdrawing from South Africa, firms dispensed 
with the need to use resources in such a manner” and instead the resources could “be 
devoted to activities more directly associated with increasing profitability” (1635). As 
time progressed, these conditions worsened, and more firms decided that incurring these 
costs were not worth the benefit. Since “restrictions on firms operating in South Africa 
increased over time, firms withdrawing later became eligible for increasing amounts of 
previously barred business opportunities outside South Africa” (1635). When making 
these decisions, MNCs had to keep in mind the “net costs of withdrawing” which 
included the “expected future cash flows from South African operations minus the 
income from disposing of South African operations” (1636). As explained by Martin 
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Meznar in Effect of Announcements of Withdrawal from South Africa on Stockholder 
Wealth, as the “antiapartheid activism grew in the US,” firms became increasingly aware 
and more likely not only to follow US sanctions but also to go above and beyond them by 
“not buy[ing] from, invest[ing] in, or work[ing] for corporations with affiliates in South 
Africa” (1635). Even local governments would begin “barring firms operating in South 
Africa from bidding on government contracts” such as in 1986 when “a committee of the 
Los Angeles city council refused to grant an engineer company a contract for upgrading 
the city’s sewer system until the firm’s parent company, Ashland Oil, pledged to 
withdraw from South Africa” (1635). Therefore, the impact for firms of continuing doing 
business with South Africa went beyond the direct profits gained from the business itself 
but also influenced the reputation of the firm which is an invaluable asset in today’s 
globalized and informed society. 
As MNCs reduced the level of businesses done with South Africa, the 
government began feeling the costs of the harm caused to its economic system. 
According to Schneider, the government not only felt that it had to suppress interest 
groups during this time, but also understood that “business owners and managers 
generally came to oppose apartheid” and that “the influence of political stability declined 
as the political costs of apartheid rose and it became a source of tension imperiling the 
stability it was supposed to protect” (31). These effects became increasingly problematic 
for the government as its economy plummeted, and the government slowly began to 
accept that “apartheid was inefficient and antithetical to economic growth” (31).  Once 
coming to this realization, it was deemed that “free markets created by the removal of 
apartheid restrictions [were] a viable solution to South Africa’s economic crisis” (31). 
Therefore, as the South African government began “placing prosperity above its other 
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interests,” the elite “would trade security for increased prosperity on the margin” (32). 
These implications made it difficult for the government of South Africa to maintain the 
institutional hold on the nation, and eventually the leaders were forced to accept that they 
had no choice but to dismantle the apartheid. With the help of Nelson Mandela and F.W. 
de Klerk, the South African government finally transitioned out of the apartheid regime, 
ending the apartheid’s human rights violations and leading to the emergence of measures 
to protect civil rights and liberties.  
Analysis 
The case of South Africa provides an example of a target country in which 
governance was relatively strong, with a high respect for the rule of law, low corruption 
levels, and high regulatory quality, where the government tried to take advantage of this 
to reduce the impact of sanctions. Despite these efforts, sanctions proved to be extremely 
effective. As a matter of fact, these sanctions rank as one of the most effective sanctions 
regime ever implemented, according to Hufbauer et al.  
The level of governance has an influence over the profits that are foregone by 
MNCs as a result of sanctions. For instance, in the case of South Africa, evading 
sanctions resulted in a larger impact in terms of foregone profits because of the pressure 
exerted by interest groups, both locally and abroad. Therefore, this case shows that 
MNCs not only focus on short-term foregone profits when making their calculations of 
whether to comply with sanctions or not, but also on long-term profits. This added 
element would imply that within the equation (2), FP would need to include 
considerations for both short and long-term profits.  
Governance plays a role in this regard, because it is easier for interest groups to 
exert additional pressure over MNCs operating in a target country that has strong 
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governance, including respect for the law, strong institutions, low corruption, and a 
strong and stable regulatory environment. Such countries tend to have stronger links to 
the external world and are generally market oriented. In such countries, the cost in terms 
of foregone long-term profits could be significant, inducing MNCs to go against their 
initial profit maximization objectives. Hence MNCs face not only the pressures from the 
sender and target states, but also the pressures from the market. The South Africa case 
helps display this as the high level of governance created different forces that eventually 
drove the profits of MNCs still operating in South Africa plummeting, leaving them with 
no choice but to stop doing business with South Africa.  
  The case of South Africa supports the initial link drawn in the statistical analysis 
that suggests that sanctions effectiveness is positively related to governance, calling 
attention to a broader definition of the variable foregone profits (FP) included in equation 
(2). In sum, the South African case proves that strong governance contains the seeds that 
undermine the incentive for MNCs to evade sanctions, regardless of the actions taken by 
the government of the target state. 
    In the case of South Africa, it was originally expected that it would have (i) a 
high level of private sector independence, (ii) strong prevalence of market forces, (iii) 
high penalties for evasion of the sanctions enacted by the sender state on the MNCs, (iv) 
low penalties for compliance of sanctions enacted by the target state, (v) low levels of 
forgone profit, and therefore (vi) high MNC compliance and high sanctions effectiveness. 
The findings showed that there was a high level of private sector independence and high 
penalties for evasion enacted by the sender state, but it has been difficult to demonstrate 
that there were low penalties for compliance of sanctions by the target state. As 
previously mentioned, there were many instances where the South African government 
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attempted to intervene in the level of transparency, attempting to inhibit the sender state’s 
ability to properly measure sanctions compliance, thus trying to reduce the actual level of 
S. However, these efforts were compensated by the actions of interest groups, which 
made it clear to MNCs that their long-term profitability was at stake if they attempted to 
evade the sanctions. Such development would not have been possible in a weak 
governance target country. Moreover, the MNCs were at first unwilling to comply with 
the sanctions as they wished to take an apolitical stance, not wanting to intermingle 
political implications with their economic profit goals. It was only after the arduous 
process of pressuring these MNCs through various means that they eventually felt it was 
worth to forego profits in the short-term and to divest or stop doing business with South 
Africa. Therefore, although it was a lengthy process, the MNCs eventually acted in 
accordance with the original hypothesis. Finally, the sanctions were effective, as 
evidenced by the eventual fall of the apartheid regime, resulting in an overhaul of 
reforms. 
Iran  
This case explores the sanctions imposed to Iran by the US in 1995 in response to 
their stepped up nuclear program and support of terrorist organizations such as 
Hezbollah, Hamas, etc. The Iranian case provides an apparent counterexample to the case 
of South Africa. Instead of having relatively high levels of governance and strong levels 
in the different dimensions, Iran has consistently demonstrated low levels of governance, 
being characterized by high levels of corruption and low respect for the rule of law. It 
must be noted that the role of MNCs was limited in Iran, and public enterprises with 
global reach dominated a large segment of the Iranian market, thus the pure profit 
maximization motives were secondary to the interest of the target state.  
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This case should be characterized by (i) a low level of private sector 
independence, (ii) weak influences of market forces and strong market controls by the 
government, (iii) low impact of penalties for evasion of the sanctions enacted by the 
sender state on the MNCs, (iv) high penalties for compliance of sanctions enacted by the 
target state, (v) high levels of foregone profits for not complying with the sanctions, (vi) 
low levels of MNC compliance and low effectiveness of the sanctions by each of the 
sanctions regimes 
Background Information 
           Iran is the 18th largest country in the world in terms of land, and with around 75 
million people, it is the 17
th
 most populated country in the world. Its GDP is around US$ 
480 billion with a GDP per capita of around US$ 6000. Iran is a member of OPEC and its 
economy is heavily dependent on oil production. It is a theocracy, with Shiite clerics 
exerting supreme authority over an elected government ran by officials of Islamic parties.             
Governance Level 
 The level of governance in Iran is highly unique. Unlike South Africa, which at 
the time of the sanctions had developed strong governance as part of its efforts to 
maintain the apartheid apparatus in check, the Iranian government was less focused on 
forming institutions along the liberal western traditions. Instead, all government efforts 
were focused on strengthening the theocratic state, or the Iranian Revolution as they 
called it. With limited attempts to diversify the economy, the country remained captive of 
its oil dependence. As noted by Ryan Christopher Rilea in Not So Splendid Isolation: An 
Analysis of Iranian Sanctions Busting, “possessing such a vast amount of a valuable 
commodity comes with the usual trappings: corruption, profiteering and heavy 
involvement by other states” (34). Not only was corruption present, but the wealth 
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provided by the oil-rich nation also created distorted objectives for the nation. According 
to Jeffrey Herbst in On the Fault Line: Managing Tensions and Divisions within 
Societies, the “spoils of corruption and patronage in Iran’s oil-rich economy provide a 
strong incentive for those who control the levers of power to maintain and consolidate 
their position” (211). Iran was a country with little respect for international law, other 
than religious precepts, with rampant corruption, and an underdeveloped regulatory 
system because of public ownership of many sectors of the economy.             
Market Environment before Sanctions       
  When the sanctions were introduced, Iran had a mixed economy dominated by oil 
production. After the revolution that took place in 1979, the Iranian economy became 
largely a centrally ran economy. A small private sector, mainly composed of family 
firms, was dwarfed by a large public sector that accounted for about 60 percent of the 
economy. The role of market forces in the economy was limited, not only because of 
public ownership of enterprises and the dominance of the oil sector, but also because of 
pervasive price controls and investment controls enacted by the government. As 
explained by Ali Farazmand in Privatization Or Public Enterprise Reform?, the 1960s 
were “marked by massive development of public enterprises in Iran” for many reasons 
such as “the strengthening of the state sector as a risk-free and stable economic partner 
for the western multinational corporations operating in less developed countries” (181). 
However, those projects were carried out with the cooperation of foreign firms, as “such 
projects were becoming of major interest to foreign corporations and the governments of 
the United States and Europe that found Iran an ideal country for political, military, and 
economic reasons” (181). In the eyes of the US in particular, Iran had all of the necessary 
elements for a good partnership. From an economic perspective, “Iranian oil was a big 
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lubricant of the Western industrial-military and commercial machine which needed as 
much oil as possible” and Iran was seen as a “big consumer market for Western 
products,” especially “after the great popular Revolution of 1978-79, the growth and 
expansion rate of public enterprises in Iran took a spiraling shape.” This growth in public 
enterprises was due to a variety of different factors including that “the revolutionary 
government took a strong interventionist posture and undertook a massive number of 
public administration functions that were carried out through public enterprise 
management” (182). This led to the “growth and expansion of public enterprises in post-
revolutionary Iran” and has had “tremendous impacts on the Iranian economy, work-
force development, GNP, and public administration” (184).  
During this time, these public enterprises were linked directly to the Iranian 
government. As Farazamand outlined, most “public enterprises [were] under the 
supervision of the Mostazafin Foundation—several thousand with a wide range of scope 
and nature of activities” that include “from commercial to production to building 
highways, bridges, dams, agriculture products and to airlines and insurance businesses” 
(184). Nevertheless, it is also important to mention that not all public enterprises were 
under the control of this “giant conglomerate organization.” Moreover, throughout this 
time, there were some privatizations of enterprises “associated with traditional 
governmental departments and organizations,” but they were “reported to have not been 
successful in meeting their economic goals due to legal, political, and economic reasons” 
(185). Farazamad illustrates that firms targeting the domestic market are more likely to 
fall under the scope of the government, and MNCs that attempt to operate outside of the 
Foundation’s rules are forced to navigate a more difficult environment, as the 
government is able to impose different obstacles on their profit maximization efforts.  
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Nature of Sanctions 
 Iran has been the subject of a long history of sanctions following the Iranian 
revolution. After the revolution, the US enacted a number of sanctions, most of which are 
still in place today. Moreover, in May 1995, following Iran stepping up of its nuclear 
program with consistent support for what the US considered terrorist organizations such 
as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, the Clinton Administration issued Executive 
Order 12959 that banned all U.S. trade with Iran” (156). After that, the United States 
Congress passed the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), applying sanctions on companies 
doing business with Iran, and issuing a number of prohibitions to commercial links with 
that country.  
According to Jeffrey J. Schott in Economic Sanctions, Oil, and Iran, these 
sanctions did not only affect direct trade but they also extended to an “estimated $4 
billion in indirect trade, mainly by American companies selling oil in third countries” (6).  
When the sanctions were initially implemented, the international community had mixed 
views due to the important role that Iran played in global oil production. According to 
Schott, “French, German and British officials” called these US sanctions “the wrong 
approach and announced that they would continue their policy of ‘critical dialogue’ with 
the Iranian regime”(6). Therefore, these sanctions were at first imposed unilaterally by 
the US.   
The situation changed in 2006, when the UN Security Council approved 
Resolution 1696, following Iran’s refusal to halt its nuclear program. This resolution 
imposed sanctions on investments in oil, petrochemicals, gas, and petroleum products. 
Moreover, these sanctions were expanded to forbid business dealings with the Iranian 
government in the sectors of banking, insurance, shipping, and Internet services for 
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commercial purposes. These sanctions were no longer unilateral, but included a 
commitment from the world at large. 
Firms’ Behavior after the Sanctions 
Iran was well prepared to deal with the new sanctions due to the previous 
experience. When the Iranian government saw the its relation with the UN deteriorate to 
the point where the enactment of sanctions seemed almost inevitable, the government 
began expanding their underground networks that it had used until then to facilitate the 
sanctions evasion once they were implemented. According to Early in Busted Sanctions: 
Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail, a “large number of American firms already 
relied upon middle-men in Dubai to sell their products” before the sanctions were to be 
implemented, even for “goods that had not been sanction[ed]” (156). This was done in an 
effort to prepare for the sanctions that were to come, as the Iranians even “deliberately 
sought to become more reliant upon Emirati re-exports in the lead-up to the sanctions” 
(157). The Iranian government, with its direct influence on the profitability of the Iranian 
firms, planned for the sanctions ahead of their enactment. 
Once the sanctions were approved, the Iranian government reacted strongly. As 
the sanctions “disrupt[ed] Iranian production, the stated-owned oil companies countered 
by self-imposing restrictions on foreign control over the oil extracting process” (157). 
The main priority of the government was to minimize the losses for the oil companies. To 
achieve this goal, Iran enacted a set of policies, which “centralized the operation of all 
domestic oil assets and ensured all revenue would flow to the government and not foreign 
firms.” By doing this, the government centralized oil revenues in a single entry point, 
making the evasion of the sanctions more easily controlled, and allowing the firms to 
seek alternative sources for this revenue.  
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However, this was only the beginning, because the Iranian government undertook 
a series of initiatives after the sanctions enactment to cushion their effects on all firms 
located in Iran. Expanding the efforts already begun the prior year, Iran sought the 
support of other countries. According to Rilea, the Iranian government began the 
“courting of states outside the US sanction regime through the use of its valuable energy 
resources and the procurement of sanctioned goods through regional third party states” 
(157). One of the key actors during the time, the UAE, served as the main sanctions 
busters to Iran during these sanctions. According to Early, the “sanctions-busting 
conducted by the UAE on Iran’s behalf during this period clearly involved significant 
levels of market-based trade—some legitimate and some illicit—and appeared to be 
driven largely by profit-seeking behavior” (145). In this case, the “UAE’s close proximity 
to Iran, its explosively growing economy and heavy engagement in international 
commerce, and its close commercial ties with Iran” made it into “one of the most 
profitable venues from which to sanctions-bust on Iran’s behalf” (175).  According to 
Matthew Swibel in Trading with the Enemy, the UAE was able to re-export a significant 
percentage of the goods that it received from the US back to Iran. According to Swibel, 
more than “a quarter of the roughly $1 billion in American goods exported to Dubai 
ended up in Iran.” In one year, export licenses could also serve as indicators of the 
increased help the UAE was providing to Iran, as export licenses jumped “47%” over the 
following years after the sanctions. The UAE was able to quickly maneuver its way to 
become the primary sanctions buster for Iran, once the Iranian government understood 
that it would need to find alternative avenues to maintain the profits for the firms. 
Therefore, the Iranian government was able to take advantage of the new status of the 
UAE at this time. According to the Wisconsin Project on nuclear arms control, in Dubai: 
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A Booming Entrepot and Growing Diversion Risk, Dubai became the “main entrepot of 
the Persian Gulf. It is what Singapore is to Southeast Asia and Hong Kong is to East 
Asia.” In assisting Iran during the sanctions, the UAE also gained the recognition for 
being one of the most thriving and convenient trading hubs in the Middle East. 
These sanctions busting transactions were done in an almost seamless manner. As 
explained by Taubman in America’s Hollow Embargo in Iran, the process was fairly 
simple. Taubmann provides an example of a trader in Tehran that “telephoned an 
appliance company in the US and said he was calling from Dubai, a small Persian Gulf 
state. He placed an order for 1,000 washing machines, had them shipped to Dubai and 
then arranged them for payment from a Canadian bank where the Iranian had opened an 
account. Since the goods were shipped to Dubai, American custom agents raised no 
objections. Once the washing machines reached Dubai they were transshipped to Iran.” In 
addition to simple consumer goods, Early explains that the UAE also “supplied Iran with 
sensitive dual-use and high-tech products” (159). According to Taubman, when these 
items were involved, the “Iranian traders contended that bribes had been paid to get 
particularly sensitive items by, including computer equipment and spare parts that can be 
used to maintain military equipment and missiles.” The success of these practices and the 
concealing of the UAE’s role is demonstrated by the fact that in the Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons list maintained by the Office of Foreign Asset Control at 
the US Department of Treasury, only 1% or 3,032 separate entries were Dubai-based. 
  Iran could afford to pay for these activities because the benefits of evading the 
sanctions far outweighed its costs. A clear example of this is provided by the case of the 
company Juma Majid Co, one of Dubai’s largest appliance wholesalers. According to 
Early, the CEO disclosed that his company had “smuggled/re-exported roughly 60-70% 
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of its stock of GE appliances to Iran” (157). The CEO understood that “abiding by the 
new US sanctions would cost his company a substantial portion of its business” and even 
questioned whether the GE American partner had “genuine interest in his company’s 
compliance” (157). This analysis clearly demonstrated that the “company had no 
incentive to comply with the harsher new sanctions unless the US government could 
credibly threaten retaliation for violating them in ways that would diminish the sanctions-
busting’s profitability” (157). Therefore, this also created a view within Dubai that the 
US government “would not punish sanctions busting violations, and, with profit margins 
as high as 40% on the sanctions-busting transactions being conducted, the risk was well 
worth taking” (157). 
           As a result, it is not surprising that the 1995/96 sanctions were deemed to be 
relatively ineffective, contrary to the UN-imposed sanctions of 2006 due to its nuclear 
program, in an extraordinary show of unity by the world at large.   
Analysis 
This case of the Iran sanctions in 1995 provides additional support for the analysis 
above that stresses that MNCs serve as the causal mechanism behind the link between 
governance level and economic sanctions effectiveness. This case not only confirms that 
a target state with a low level of governance can achieve low levels of sanctions 
effectiveness as shown in the statistical analysis, but also helps illustrate how the actions 
of the MNCs can provide a causal mechanism for this link. As a result, the case of Iran 
provides additional support for the hypothesis of this thesis. In this case the target country 
has weak governance and the result is as expected: low sanctions effectiveness as a result 
of MNC activity.  
This case makes it clear that the equation (2) continues to explain the forces that 
Pia Figuerola 
 
 
53
guide firms’ reactions to the sanctions, even when MNCs are not prevalent, market forces 
are weak, and the relative influence of target and sender state is different than in the 
South African case. Iran firms were more protected from the reach of the sender state, 
and more vulnerable to the reach of the target state. Moreover, in a country with the 
characteristics of Iran, market forces and the long-term impact on profitability have 
limited importance. Therefore in such an environment, firms perceive the cost of 
penalties imposed by the sender state as being relatively small when compared with the 
short-term foregone profits and the cost that could impose the target state for compliance. 
The existence of corruption makes it even easier to evade sanctions, thus further reducing 
S. Again, the level of governance is the variable that allows firms to react in a certain 
way to the imposition of sanctions.  
At the same time, it should be recognized that the cost of reducing S becomes 
more and more expensive as time passes. Eventually, the sender state becomes aware of 
the leakage points, and takes action to oppress them. A clear example of this includes the 
efforts taken by the US to seek the support of the world at large to sanction Iran, resulting 
in the UN sanctions of 2006. 
      In summary, weak governance with increased levels of corruption and low levels of 
respect for the rule of law allowed the target government to have significant control over 
the operations of the firms. In this case, these were mainly public enterprises rather than 
MNCs, which maximized profits for the benefit of the state. With such an enormous 
degree of government control, corruption was rampant, and there were no market forces 
to put a limit to it because the country was isolated from international trade other than 
through oil exports. However, the same factors described in equation (2) were at play 
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when it came to the implementation of sanctions and the results accordingly.  
According to the initial hypothesis, this case should have shown (i) a low level of 
private sector independence, (ii) weak market forces, (iii) low actual penalties for evasion 
of the sanctions enacted by the sender state on the MNCs, (iv) high penalties for 
compliance of sanctions enacted by the target state, (v) low level of MNC compliance 
with sanctions in the target state, and (vi) low effectiveness of the sanctions by each of 
the sanctions regimes. As discussed, variables (i) and (ii) were clearly outlined, as the 
Iranian government insisted on being heavily involved within the markets and made it 
often difficult for firms, even those that had gone through the process of privatization, to 
fully thrive. In terms of (iii), the penalties enacted by the sender state, the US failed to 
adequately enforce their sanctions regime, only detecting a few of the evasions that 
occurred through the UAE, and therefore was unable to deter firms from finding alternate 
ways of conducting trade with Iran. Nevertheless, as the sanctions progressed, the level of 
penalties began increasing. Regarding the penalties enacted by the target state (iv), 
although the Iranian government imposed high levels of penalties for firms that complied 
with the sanctions and made it difficult for the sender state to gain the information needed 
to monitor the relevant sanctions evasions, it also added benefits to the sanctions evasion. 
By reaching out to foreign countries and enabling firms to easily evade the sanctions 
through the use of mostly illicit trade with the UAE, the government not only increased 
the cost associated with complying with the sanctions but also added to the benefit side of 
the cost-benefit analysis as evading the sanctions resulted in entering new markets. As 
shown by the evidence as mentioned above, there was low level of compliance as firms 
were able to maintain their profit levels high as a result of the alternate trade made 
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available through the UAE and other sources. Therefore, as demonstrated by the 
Hufbauer data in their index of sanctions effectiveness for this case, the Iran sanctions 
were relatively unsuccessful, as the leaders did not make the concessions that were 
sought.  
Country Cases: Summary of Results 
            The conclusions derived from the analysis of these two country cases can be 
summarized in the table presented below, which displays the relative levels of 
governance, regulatory quality, freedom from corruption, and sanctions effectiveness.  
Year Sender 
State 
Target 
State 
Governance 
Level 
Regulatory 
Quality (1)  
Freedom from 
Corruption (2)  
Sanctions 
Effectiveness 
(3)  
Consistent 
with 
hypothesis? 
1995 US Iran  121 4 29 0 Yes 
1986 US S. Africa  377 63 50 2 Yes 
Notes: 
(1) Regulatory Quality: From 0 to 100 (high regulatory quality) 
(2) Freedom of Corruption: From 0 to 100 (free from corruption) 
(3) Sanctions Effectiveness: From 0 (failure) to 2 (success) 
 
     The results support the existence of a positive relationship between the level of 
governance in the target state and the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. Furthermore, 
as outlined by the case studies mentioned above, there is clear evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that the cost-benefit analysis of firms during these sanctions regimes could 
serve as causal mechanisms for this link. 
SECTION 7: Conclusion and Policy Lessons 
Economic sanctions have become a critical instrument of economic statecraft. 
They are extremely useful mechanism designed to exert pressure on other countries 
without recourse to more extreme and costly actions, such as war. However, despite their 
increasing popularity, there is a growing understanding that sanctions effectiveness is 
somewhat limited. A vast literature has analyzed this development and has identified a 
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number of factors that undermine the effectiveness of sanctions, including lack of 
international cooperation, prior relations between sender and target states, the average 
cost of sanctions, the existence of trade linkages, etc. The majority of these studies were 
conducted from a macro point of view, stressing the role played by the governments, 
therefore, they failed to delve into the microelements that lead agents to comply or not 
with sanctions. This is an important drawback because in recent years, there has been 
increasing awareness that in a globalized world, the main actors in the implementation of 
sanctions are the MNCs that handle international trade. Understanding the factors that 
influence the decisions of these MNCs is essential to understand what determines 
sanctions effectiveness.  
This thesis attempts to make a contribution towards explaining the effectiveness 
of sanctions by focusing on the factors that influence the actions of MNCs when it comes 
to implementing sanctions. In analyzing these factors, it has become evident that the 
environment in which firms operate plays an important role in their actions. Among the 
determinants of this environment, the governance of the target state holds important 
implications for the eventual effectiveness of the regime as a whole. This thesis focuses 
on this factor, seeking to understand the microelements that explain the relationship 
between governance in the target state and sanctions’ effectiveness. Approaching the 
problems from three different perspectives (analytical, statistical and country cases), this 
thesis found support for the hypothesis of a positive relationship between governance in 
the target state and sanctions effectiveness. This outcome reflects the strategic choice 
planning of the MNCs located in the target state in response to the imposition of 
sanctions. The findings of this thesis support the view that the stronger the governance in 
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the target country, the more likely that sanctions would be successful and vice-versa.  
These conclusions have important policy consequences. Sender states need to take 
into account the governance in the target state as they design a sanctions regime. When 
sanctions are applied to a country with strong governance, the sender state should expect 
relatively quick and strong results from the sanctions, while if they are applied to a weak 
governance country, poorer results and delays should be expected. Furthermore, in 
tailoring sanctions to target states with low levels of governance, a number of 
considerations must be taken into account regarding the target country, including how to 
deal with its informal channels, corruption, and strong business linkages with partner 
countries. Accordingly, the sender country could afford a more hands off approach in the 
case of sanctions to countries with strong governance, but would need a more proactive 
approach when dealing with a weak governance country. This has important implications 
for the design and implementation of extraterritorial controls. 
This thesis also highlights the dilemma faced by target states that are trying to 
implement actions aimed at fostering development. There is ample evidence that strong 
governance is good for the economic, social and political development of countries. 
However, this thesis highlights that strong governance makes a country more vulnerable 
to the use of economic statecraft. Especially for certain target states that would be 
possibly susceptible to economic sanctions in the future, this finding could make them 
less willing to actively pursue reforms to strengthen governance, thus undermining their 
development policies. 
In sum, this thesis brings into the discussion a new variable that could help 
explain the effectiveness of sanctions. In this context, it could be argued that this thesis 
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makes a contribution to the sanctions literature as it suggests the need to focus on 
additional factors to make sanctions more effective. Strengthening the effectiveness of 
sanctions is important not only because of statecraft purposes, but also because of the 
associated costs. Sanctions could exert a heavy burden on the population of the target 
state. Therefore, making sanctions more likely to achieve their results with limited 
pressure, in terms of coverage and duration, could reduce the cost of the sanctions for the 
population of the target state. As many target states are undergoing efforts of 
development, reducing this cost could provide for higher levels of social efficiency 
moving forward. 
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Appendix: Economic analysis of impact of trade sanctions  
According to David Rowe in Manipulating the Market, trade sanctions will “fall 
into four categories” as they may be applied “against countries that are small on world 
markets (price takers)” or “against countries that are large on world markets (have market 
power)” and within those two they can be applied “either on that country’s exports or on 
its imports” (20). When analyzing effects of a sanction against a small country’s exports, 
Figure 1 can display how the target country’s economy will be altered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The left hand panel signifies the “target country’s external market for exports” 
and “relates the quantity of exports supplied to world markets to price by tracing out the 
difference between the domestic supply and demand schedules given in the right-hand 
panel” (21). At the “autarky price, Pa, exports will be zero because domestic demand 
equals supply” yet as world price rises, supply “Exceeds domestic demand and the 
quantity of export rises” to arrive at Pw (21). Once some of this country’s trading 
partners impose a boycott, this will “segregate foreign importers into two groups: those 
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that participate in the boycott (X’X) and those who do not (OX’). This will result in 
“domestic exporters perceive[ing] the boycott as a drop in demand and respond by 
competitively lowering prices to secure sales to importers who remain in the market” 
(21). Therefore, although the world price does not change, it “drives a wedge between the 
prevailing world price Pw, and the sanctions-depressed price obtained by this country’s 
exporters Ps” (21). When reverting this to MNCs who will be the producers in this 
scenario, the “slackened demand for exports causes production to fall from OH to OG, 
and price to fall form Pw to Ps” also leading to a “loss of producer surplus inflicted by 
the sanctions, shown as the “sum of C1 and C2” (22). Furthermore, the economic cost of 
the boycott “to the target economy consists of the deadweight welfare costs created by 
the sanctions plus the economic windfall that is captured by those foreign importers still 
serving this market (Ct+W) while the cost to “target country’s exporters” which represent 
MNCs is “even larger consisting of the entire sum of deadweight costs and windfall 
transfers (Ct+W1+W2).” 
 This is a different case than the analysis for sanctions that are focused on the 
small country’s imports. Looking at figure 1, import sanctions differ as they have an 
upward sloping demand curve for the import markets as opposed to the export sanctions, 
which had a downward sloping supply curve. Therefore, the sanctions price would be 
below the autarky price and above the world price. This would “reduce target country’s 
imports” and “create a domestic shortage that propels their price upward to Ps” (28). Like 
a boycott, “the embargo imposes deadweight welfare costs and windfall transfers” (28).  
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